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NATION STATES AND THE REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL FINANCE
Siddharth Raja*
INTRODUCTION
In a topic increasingly dominated by fancy acronyms and compact phrases
used to identify and explain allegedly crucial macro-economic trends, this essay
concerns itself with a stark analysis of some of the key issues associated with the
concept known as the End of Geography.' This Paper focuses on two questions
broadly stated as:

1.

Is the current trend and anticipated fulure acceleration of global financial
integration, an irreversible process of decline in the relative importance of
national economic policy making?

2.

Can States seek to sllpervise!reglllate,2 either unilaterally or multilaterally,
financial markets without having to incur the approbation of the market forces
and contend with phenomena such as 'regulatory arbitrage'?3

*

V Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore. This paper was
originally prepared and presented by the author at the Politics of Global Finance course at the
London School of Economics' International Summer Programme, 1996. The author wishes to
acknowledge the guidance of Prof. Nilesh Dattani, Professor of International Relations, L.S.E. and
his Research Assistant, Mr. Wolf Hassdorf. Their constant critical encouragement, as reflected in
this Paper, hopefully provides a fresh analysis to the ongoing debate on global finance.
As understood in this paper, it refers to a state of economic development where geographical
location matters much less than before in issues of international financial relationships. Financial
market regulators will no longer hold full sway over their regulatory jurisdictional
territory as
money, being fungible, will continue to avoid the confines of existing location-centric
financial
markets. The 24 hour global financial market place has meant the virtual obliteration of space and
a dramatic compression of time. See, Richard O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of
Geography 1-3 (1992).

2

3

In this essay, regulation is not understood as the presence of too many burdensome domestic legal
requirements and other procedures for control of financial flows both within a nation and without.
Instead, it refers to those structures of government policy and administration which (a) seek to
promote the achievement of the objectives of financial or monetary policy in general and (b)
provide for the new transnational financial structure to function effectively as a system based on
the efficient allocation of capital in the world economy and stability in the light of growing volumes
of capital flows. To use a friendlier phrase, supervision rather than regulation. See generally, David
Gowland, The Regulation of Financial Markets in the 1990s 39 (1990) and Philip G. Cerny, The

De-regulation and Re-regulation of Financial Markets in a more open world 55.
In a globally integrated market based on free flows of capital across borders, regulatory arbitrage
refers to the ability of market operators to move between financial markets depending upon the
levels of regulation in each individual market. Money will move to that market where transaction
and other running costs incurred as a result of regulations are much lower (or even the least) than
elsewhere - the path of least obstruction. See generally, Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan,

Financial Regulation in the Global Economy 7 (1995).
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Needless to say, the reactions of different states to the emerging international
scenario of deeper financial integration has varied depending on the situation each
state finds itself in at present: the stage of development and the structure of each
national economy determining both the response of individual nations to the changed
economic reality and more importantly, proving test beds to verify as a fact that
diminishing national economic autonomy is a truism in an age of globalisation.
Probably this aspect is an issue whose time is yet to come as more nations join the
bandwagon of economic and financial integration at different levels of 'take off'.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL

INTEGRATION

Spectacular reductions in the cost of transportation, telecommunications and
computation have greatly increased the ease with which firms can bridge the natural
barriers of time and space that separate national markets, especially in financial
services. At the outset, there exists a distinction between financial markets and the
markets for trade in goods and services. While the latter has rapidly grown with
increasing global specialisation and international competition since the Second
World War, the former has by leaps and bounds outstripped it over the last couple
of decades, ever since the Interest Equalisation Tax in the USA in the early 60' s
forced firms and other market operators to look for cheaper lines of credit globally,
resulting in the growth of the Euro-currency and Bonds markets.4
There is no doubt that key financial markets such as London, New York and
Tokyo which are so closely integrated bOtll in terms of market structures have
enabled .the creation of a global financial market place. There now exists a 24 hour
market place. Technology and advanced communications networks have in no small
measure contributed to the phenomena of staying ahead of the setting sun speculation gains, as a result of funds transfers from markets that are prior in time
in the GMT day to benefit from price movements in markets that are behind in time.
Business innovations and the creative exploitation of the advantages that
technology provides, has enabled market operators to effectively use technology to
further the process of global financial integration. The concept of fungible money
being transferred effortlessly in the form of plastic and electronic exchanges is the
best example of using lie vehicle of technology to innovate on lie markets. There
are, lierefore, two sets of causes for increasing world economic integration:
1.

4

Technology and consequent market, social and cultural reactions adapting to
liis technology have sharply reduced lie effective economic distance among
nations. In a recently published survey,5 it was further underlined that technolSee, Paul Feeney, Loan Securitisation: Euronote & Eurocommercial Paper Markets (1986) as to
the lET imposed in 1963 which aimed at discouraging foreign borrowers from making bond issues
in the US market, which only forced international borrowers, unable to satisfy their need for funds
in the domestic US market, to accommodate their needs by floating term bond issues on a
world wide scale denominated in dollars (the dollar glut helping in no small measure).

5

See, The Economic Survey of Technology in Finance, The Economist, October 26th 1996.
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ogy has rapidly changed the way financial services are designed and delivered,6 and
2.

Government regulation of their financial markets that inhibited cross-border
transactions have been relaxed or even dismantled. Deregulation countermanded by government policies has seen the disappearance of separation
fences that limited international capital movements, restricted imports and
subsidised exports. Together, deregulation and technological advances have
complimented each other and dramatically altered the global economy.

Significantly, the emerging scenario of global finance is subject to a crucial
caveat. The Economist believes that" .... .in so far as technology is changing finance,
it is not because of a particular invention or insight. Rather, it is doing so when the
new technologies are broadly in sympathy with how people and firms wish to
conduct their financial services .... " This change is important. From what was in the
past seen as technology merely automating the processes of finance, today and in
the foreseeable future, one may actually be witnessing a complete re-engineering;
both in terms of technology finally delivering an entirely revolutionary commercial
model, as well as in the attitudinal orientation of financial suppliers to manage these
tools in the provision of quality services to their customers - and as The Economist
clarifies, at a profit.
If history is to be believed, then the evolution of primitive societies into
organised political society symbolised by the nation slate was the final outcome of
man's natural desire for order and stability. As that need would continue as long as
man is a social animal bound by cultural ties, the world will always be organised
politically into nation states with sovereign governments. However, on the other
hand, increasing economic integration among nations continues to erode differences
among national economies and undermine the authority of states. Are we looking
at a shell state; nations only in name and designation but lacking the sovereign power
(and in most cases the will) to radically alter the markets without inviting its wrath?
There lies an issue.
The stark logic of the market is efficiency, which invariably means that some
are losers either because they are inefficient or more likely that the system denies
them the chance of being efficient. To use Darwinian type social logic - the survival
of the fittest. As Reich observes: 'each nation's primary political task will be to cope
with the centrifugal forces of the global economy which tear at the ties binding
citizens together - bestowing ever greater wealth on the most skilled ... while
consigning the less skilled to declining standards of living.'7 If the integration of
financial markets, have diminished national economic policy autonomy and reduced

6

Ibid., p. 4.

7

See, Robert Reich, The Work of Nations: A Blueprint for the Future 3 (1993).
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the room for exercise of political sovereignty, 8 can states cope with this task of social
welfare, reorganisation and redistribution of new wealth; and even if they have the
requisite authority to actually make a difference, are they increasingly willing to
enact their role, or is the fear of losing precious potential on the markets that
protective steps towards alleviating the condition of the disempowered must
necessarily involve, too high a price to pay? What this paper empahsises is that hard
economic logic alone cannot explain the state's role in global financial integration
and its pro-active aspects ought not to be ignored in any study of the international
political economy of financial markets.
THE FIRST

QUESTION

The two questions are interlinked - if there is a decline in the state's role in
the context of regulating financial markets, then their enforcing any kind of
supervision would to that extent be hinged by other considerations.
The response to the first question is clear: while there is a decline in the relative
power of states in the financial world, it is not irreversible in that national economic
policy will still remain an important component of the rules governing markets.
In simple terms, financial instruments - whether bank deposits, loans, stock,
bonds or complicated derivative instruments - are ultimately claims on real resources, goods and services.9 Efforts to restrict flows of financial instruments
therefore hinder exchange of goods and services, thus impeding the transfer of
resources to their best use. The result is reduced efficiency and growth. So, while
the markets increasingly decide the allocation of free resources, states have a role
to play in supervising the transfer of the underlying assets. States still retain authority
to decide their allocation.
Restrictions merely for the sake of regulation is opposed to the threading of
markets - money would. simply flee to those markets that are less regulated.
However, basic framework guidelines are necessary for any market irrespective of
the predominant philosophy. The very operation of market economies is dependent
upon the existence of a priori rules, which in conjunction with forces of demand and
supply create the necessary playing conditions. States provide stability to financial
markets and that is their first role in the global arena.lO
8

9

When separation fences disappear, the distinction between the international aspects of a country's
economy (at-the-border) and those essentially domestic (behind-the-border) is blurred. Deeper
behind-the-border integration (such as tax codes, budgets etc.) means an analysis of the economic
and political aspects of virtually all non-border policies and practices, chiefly, cross border spill
overs, diminished political autonomy and challenges to political sovereignty.

See, John Board, et al., Derivatives Regulation I (1995), where regulation is only justified if there
is harm or externalities imposed on other participants or in terms of market failure.
10 It could be justifiably argued that stability in the system could be provided by some other institution
or person rather than the state. The state however is a continuously present, long term player itself
whose horizons stretch the furthest in terms of objectives. The real objective unlike any other and that is what makes it so unique - is that the state is not solely searching for profit. In any case,
the state provides the place where the market is situate.
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So long as the international system is dominated by national currencies,
national economic policy will always playa role, albeit much diminished. It is here
that contrasting the situation in developed and developing countries is illuminating.
While the Basel accord of 1988 stipulating common capital standards for major
banks doing business transnationally is probably one of few multilateral agreements
between developed states (and illustrative of relatively few such or other similar
requirements domestically); in India, all commercial banks have to maintain stringent capital requirement norms, II which consequent upon liberalisation the Americans
especially, are calling for aquicker relaxation. Strange enough though, foreign banks
have stepped up their presence in India despite such regulations. Demonstration
perhaps of other domestic factors behind the convergence between higher levels of
supervision and stronger integration, depending on how one looks at it as a partial
fulfillment of capacity or as a hindrance. In any case, most market operators would
fear to enter markets that have little in the way of a regulatory regime or are too lax
in its implementation.
Finally, harmonisation simply for the sake of leveling the playing field can be
dangerous if nations compromise on the central objective of strengthening the
international financial system. In situations where national regulations and domestic
choices produce disguised trade barriers,12 nations might resort to the neo-classical
advocacy of leveraging ones competitive advantage to maximise gain.13 National
regulation therefore assumes a significant premium.
That would be too ideal a situation - the development of global financial links
has gone beyond each nation's individual capacity to gain by enforcing effective
measures to counter regulatory arbitrage on the system as a whole.14 Of course,
collaborating voluntarily and transnationally (either regionally or internationally)
could solve the prisoners' dilemma of a hegemone seeking to regulate backed by the
power of all, yet unsure of the will of all. That in the ultimate analysis depends on

II

See, Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 & Banking Companies (Regulation)

Act, 1949, as to reserve
requirements - one withinth •. bank called Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and one kept with the Central
Bank, the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR), minimum deposit ratio to lending and priority sector
lending, etc.

12 For example, for leather imports into Germany, there exists strict rules as to 'green' packaging
materials minus plastic aDd other non-degradable substances. Obviously, importation cost are
increased on the German importer making imports that much less attractive to domestic players.
On the other hand, if a nation places no value of the protection of the ozone layer and allows
industries which are polluting to be set up, then it can gain from a net increase in the terms of trade,
much the same way that the converse takes place in the previous example.
13 Competitive inequities is the foundation
enous system is pernicious.

of Ricardian

Theory of International

Trade - a homog-

14 See, Susan Strange, States and Markets 24 (1994) as to structural and relational power. Here in
a given context - globalisation
hegemone. But that hegemone

- relational power is absent in any state, including any purported
either unilaterally or in conjunction with other nations - a theme

that is revisited in the second question - can exercise structural power to gain from competitive
benefits. That exercise must be in the context of the market forces.
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the political weights accorded to the interests of particular nations reflecting the
preferences and objectives of sections of its citizens capable of taking economic
decisions. To keep intact minimal national autonomy must mean collaboration as the
paradox of global markets and national policy making has left that as the only
possible way ahead for regulation.
THE SECOND

QUESTION

Cooperation and coordination form the core of the emerging international
financial regulatory regime. The content of such a regime is common consensus on
certain basic minimum standards or requirements which arises on three central
issues:

1.

What should be the rights of access to markets in different countries?15

2.

What rules should apply? and

3.

Which national or supranational regulatory body should supervise and enforce
these rules?16

How states actually arrive at such an agreement is a political question on
evaluation of national goals and perspectives - another instance of the great divide
between nations, making some of these discussions on financial integration seem
rather out of place. Historically, the countries of the south have generally been
centrally planned economies - ranging from communist states (Vietnam), through
military dictatorships and tribal oligarchies (most African nations) to democracies
(India). In an era of liberalisation and growing interaction of these markets with the
world economy, governments are faced with a strange dilemma. Appropriate
government participation and support in the domestic economy is needed for the
regeneration of basic infrastructure such as roads, power etc. At the same time, there
is a need for government contraction so that benefits from liberalisation are
channelled by the market into the most efficient hands. However, that can only be
absorbed by the economy if its infrastructural base is sufficiently strong. Increasingly, states of the third world are escaping this trap by bringing in private finance
even in long-gestation, lower-profit margin infrastructural development.
Faster global integration has been accompanied by political pluralism and
decentralisation of decision making structures in national economies. National
economic policy making power therefore has become more diffused. In the future,
the principal challenge of creating a broad framework of guidelines supervising the
financial market would be to integrate all players in the domestic economy with the
barest minimum of interference With the market. Regulation in such a context can
be seen on a cooperation spectrum of possible approaches extending from total

15 Herring and Litan, supra n. 3.
16 The European Community has addressed all these three key issues, NAFr A and GAIT too, though
in the laUer, rules as to rights of access were dropped eventually.
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national autonomy to complete integration.
therefore be identified?:

I?

[1997

What kind of regulatory structures can

1.

National systems both government and institutional,

2.

Regional conclaves with or without a nodal regulatory agency, and

3.

International

agencies with a common minimum basis of action.

The question as posed asks whether states can seek to regulate without having
to face 'regulatory arbitrage'. Firstly, regulatory arbitrage is not based purely on
price differentials. Other factors, such as corruption levels, general investment
attitude, etc., all contribute to firms making the decision to leave if regulation
becomes to stifling. Thus, even in cases of relatively higher levels of regulation,
players may continue if profits are assured. Further, the cost of withdrawal after
funds have been sunk into the country, may outwiegh the benefits of quitting an
over-regulated market.
Secondly, maybe self-regulation of financial markets is ideal? Here the central
question is the management of markets as opposed to its regulation. How much the
market is to be left alone begs an answer. Cross border economic integration is
mismatched against national economic sovereignty and the domains of markets have
come to coincide less and less with national jurisdictional limitations. How much
that leaves countries in charge of their overall political situation depends on the
levels of integration - more integrated economies having to cooperate to solve
common problems and less integrated ones continuing to be outside the global
market if they choose to carryon with burdensome regulations.
CONCLUSION
The powerless state is a myth.18 Globalisation has not meant the obliteration
of the state, but merely its reconfiguration in terms of money, power and dependency.19 The edge of its economic sovereignty - instruments of market regulation
- has been blunted but not removed altogether. As Kenneth Scott observed:
'financial regulation is intended to promote the public good by requiring individuals

17 Herring and Little suggest that this covers six ranges of responses - national autonomy, mutual
recognition (entails the explicit acceptance by each state of the standards of other states, primarily
in the context of regional groupings such as the EU), monitored decentralisation
(such as G7' s
meetings), coordination (such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the 1985 Framework Convention
on reducing CFC emissions to protect the ozone layer), explicit harmonisation (entails the creating
of a supranational body regulatory body enforcing action on the basis of voluntary acceptance by
states to the common minimum standards) and federalist mutual governance (such as the relationships between the American states and the federal centre).
18 See, The Myth of the Powerless State, The Economist, October 7th 1995.

19 See, Ron Martin, Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic Autonomy: The End of Geography? in Corbridge, Stuart, et ol. (Eds.) Money, Power & Space 274
(1994).
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and firms to change their preferred behaviour in ways that will benefit others', This
is the basis for identifying the criteria of appropriate size of the supervisory and
regulatory domain:
1.

The extent of externalities where international cooperation is needed to deal
with systemic risks, both domestically and across borders,

2.

The existence of prisoners' dilemmas among regulators,

3.

The economies of scale in administration, where overlapping regulatory
domains, though inefficient, could provide dynamic chances for structural
arbitrage, disciplining poor regulators and rewarding the efficient, and

4.

The trade-off between the values of uniformity and diversity.

In other words, that size is best and that domain appropriate which creates
optimal efficiency.
To conclude, as Susan Strange20 might argue, while relationally the state as an
embodiment of regulation is dead vis-a-vis the market, functionally states as a whole
still retain their power. After all, if the state system as we know it, continues to rest
on democracy then the mandate of social responsibiiity will always force the hand
of the state to act in furtherance of equity and justice, undoubtedly not to curb the
efficiency of the market but to discipline it for general good. Who disciplines what
and in whose domain will always remain a hotbed of contention between the state
and the market. That is the demand of governance - unless of course, as some
radicals would like us to believe, global governance itself has broken free of the state
system. Then we, the world's citizens and ever more increasingly, coteries of
powerful people made rich by the market, will have to decide the discipline of our
financial world - state or no state, Who then are 'we' to decide if we do share cultural
ties which lies at the heart of every nation? Won't that single fact - national pride
- keep the nation state at the centre of all political debate? The fallacy of the
withering state.

20 See generally, Strange, supra n. 4.

